That is why there should be clear and measurable outcomes. I don’t need to worry about whether that person is also working for another DAO if I have onboarded well and leveled up an individuals access to opportunities. They are delivering or not delivering.
Now of course we will ask and in FDD I work to coach the outcome owners to assess this BEFORE commiting. One advantage of the way FDD works is an outcome owner can say, “you seem great, we have 4 hours a week available for you” then they can determine if that person fits within a week or two. Imagine you own the outcome of going through all the current grant eligibility policy and deduping/updating it. When you present your weekly accomplishments to all of FDD on Monday, you will probably want to update your team to be successful.
There is also a DAO vibe similar to the old saying, “Only look in your neighbors cup to see if they have enough.”
This round we are moving from using GIA for the disputes only, to using it for all the approvals of new grants. Next round we will probably focus on dynamic criteria to adapt it for side rounds.
Another cool part of that is we could use it for other things too. Things like filtering proposals, community assessment of work quality, and even reviews of new DAO contributor applications.
We have a clear difference of opinion here, but aren’t as far off as I initially thought we were. I do believe that FDD has a norm of receiving the reserves. I’d argue that instead of a brand new steward (lol) pushing us to change our norms, we use your suggestion and have CSDO discuss and present a unified solution prior to Season 14.
This seems reasonable to me because we have:
a proven track record of not abusing the reserves in the past
$70k in treasury management gains last season (more than the entire DAO combined)
High transparency - Perhaps the most transparency of any workstream (DAOops, which uses our system or maybe moonshot, but it is onchain rather than human readable)
Honestly, thank you for your time. I felt a little blindsided at first because we didn’t discuss this before getting to the public forum, but I think you made the right decision to post this and follow up on every thread. It is a good example of the behavior we would like to see from all stewards!
In fact, Sybill resistance is vital to many DAOs, and many are struggling how to protect their decision making and reward systems!
Proves a) the value produced in FDD work stream - and b) yes, agree - let’s explore how to make this a building block for Web3, and (yes!) a component in Gitcoin value streams and token utility.
I support that FDD work stream aims for the moonshot version because of the opportunities here - and I’m looking forward to see progress towards a PoPP in upcoming seasons!
Great discussion going on here that is answering questions for many. Thank you Kyle for challenging the fdd to be fully accountable to the the community and ensuring the excess gets trimmed. It is pushback like that which make for an accurate and lean budget. Every workstream should be trying to provide and solicit feedback like this imo. I have a few thoughts and comments provided below. Looking forward to seeing you around and sharing the latest fdd news.
Yes we have considered it. The idea first arose when thinking about how to hold folks accountable for ‘bad’ or exploitative behaviour as dao members. This got expanded to ecosystem participants. By taking a stake from new grant applicants (AND potentially EVERY dao member) we now have an ability to incentivize and shape behaviors within the dao. But carrying out these types of thought experiments has a cost. It seems like the FDD is being told “No you are not meant to be innovating. Your budget is inflated because of un-needed R&D” while in the very next breath we are being asked “where is the innovation?”
And although such discussions about innovation happen regularly we are mostly focused on carrying out the mission as inherited from Gitcoin inc. We simply lack the people needed to successfully complete the mission while conducting major R & D. But we are continuously growing and filling out gaps in our range of sme. The targeted strategy sessions guided us as a team toward filtering out the weak results from our future goals.
The fact FDD has been a great steward of its budgets demonstrates competence and responsibility. This should be reason to increase the FDD budget not decrease it. The FDD is good with its treasury and they are eager to enlarge the mission focus. I want to see the FDD continue to grow and improve. It was said PGF might be the heart and soul of Gitcoin. Ouch. Well maybe that would make the FDD the liver? We filter out the junk?
Either way, it is hard for me to label any one group as the ‘heart’ of Gitcoin. It is more of a vibe or a philosophy. But I do know the FDD team is stronger than ever, and ready to carry out the Gitcoin mission.
Full support for this budget. And a sweet dCompass quest.
Joe is a public ‘great’ (nice one Ben) and we are living in the proof. The Dao is maturing nicely. Membership is growing and the folks i’m seeing are very qualified.
Full support for this budget. Bias disclaimer: I am part of this crew.
staking in the process will have no more of an effect than an increased gas price. it’s an interesting idea, but ultimately a sybil attacker already has to front a large amount for gas. although, it would be worth simulating the affects of such a mechanism. i will keep this in mind as we progress with the matrix (red team) squad.
exactly what is duplicative? the data storage layer is part of ground control, the function of which has been pushed off for a very long time.
also, DAO Ops has proven to be too coarse to actually have a tangible impact in FDD… bubble-up emergence of organization is more affective in both the short and long term (isn’t this what the DAO wants to facilitate…?) pragmatism (natural selection) rules, not downward imposed idealistic solutions.
do you know what the GIA even is? it’s goal is to decentralize and cut costs in the long term. maybe we aren’t communicating it’s function properly (@David_Dyor and i just discussed writing up an article to sum everything up), but simply dismissing it as the “wrong solution” seems naive…
however i still think your reasoning isn’t very well thought out. the double-paying you are referring to is the growing pains of offboarding this responsibility onto the DAO. @omnianalytics is running the initiative to offload our sybil ML process partially onto the community (open source) in collaboration with the data storage layer squad that I lead, which will alleviate a lot of funding in the future.
again… staking is not a very well thought out solution, slashing GIA will only harm the ecosystem and make the review process:
take significantly longer
require a good deal of human training/inconsistent grant reviews
cost more to pay for human expert grant reviews
the same amount of centralized (if not – more)
inhibit our ability to do finer grained data analysis of the grant-reviewal process
Once again, there is a great discussion on another FDD proposal; which is consistent with FDDs values to provide an immense amount of transparency to their operations.
I am supportive of this proposal.
FDD is leading the efforts of progressive decentralization within the Gitcoin DAO community.
FDD provides a great amount of Workstream structure for the other Workstreams to follow.
But also I think what @kyle mentions here is incredibly important. I think there is a need to have a detailed conversation on Workstream treasury management moving forward. I think FDDs practices are proven healthy for the Gitcoin DAO in general, and there should be a learning, trial & error process for all the workstreams to implement and improve what FDD puts on the table as an example.
This is incorrect. There is currently no financial hurdle to create a grant as they are not on-chain. Staking would add a component of financial commitment while we wait to have on-chain grants.
I would love to understand this more and see where we / DAO Ops can do better. There is often a natural tension between “best for the DAO” and “best for my workstream” that we should be constantly evaluating.
I likely don’t have enough context! It was presented as a tool to allow for programmatic reviews and that it was necessary to build due to the volume of grants being created. The old joke of spending thousands to design a space pen versus just grabbing a pencil came to mind here. I would love to learn more.
I have really enjoyed the conversation, and learning this has sparked for me and others. This is exactly the outcome I have hoped for. I also don’t mind that I am in the minority with my opinion. This is why we have lots of stewards.
i didn’t say it costs gas to create a grant… the “fraud tax” that you mentioned is in reference to gas costs for contributions & the splitting of funds into separate wallets…in order for you to donate to any grant it costs gas, not only that but sybil accounts have to split their money to other wallets somehow. how else would they do this without paying gas?
i’m not sure what you mean by “programmatic reviews”. but it’s basically just taking the criteria that human reviewers usually base their decisions off of, turn them into criteria with “pass” or “fail” buttons for each one, which makes it easier for humans to review faster, more consistently, and with lower barrier to entry.
it’s basically just a nicer google forms setup curated for the grant review process. alongside this, there is also all of the usual grant review processes that existed before, hence the larger budget, we just rebranded it all to “GIA”.
your space pen/pencil joke is still lacking a sense of reality with respect to GIA/FDD-policy. GR12 was great, and our human reviewers learned a lot, but their path was a little inefficient. a closer analogy would be that we found our way home from school, but walked an extra 2 miles due to some inefficient path choices. now, were leveraging our experience to take turns that get us home quicker.
my recommendation for you is to seek context before making very impactful budgetary decisions. this is partially FDD’s fault as a workstream, and it’s something that myself and others are trying to push towards communicating context better. maybe try to participate a little more, especially when it seems like things don’t make sense.
The GIA is a tool that would allow us to further decentralize the grant review process and would make the community own it more and more over time while leveraging the knowledge of the participants . It’s very interesting and allows for a lot of experimentation with low costs
We imagine a future in which the GIA will be self funded with a grant on Gitcoin and the reviewers will be incetivised that way and maybe create their own sub DAO hybrid, idk
I appreciate the time and thought you have give to our beloved FDD btw, these are very good conversations to have and they could lead to very constructive things.
During GR12 we accomplished a lot here at the FDD(haha, I’m part of the stream, how could I not be biased), we actually delivered and defended the DAO while maintaining credible neutrality. We experimented and decentralized all of the squads and even the core structure that we used in GR12 and evolved to this format for GR13. The OS that Joe presented is really an innovation and I think this is quite “unique” in GItcoin DAO. We have also been the home of research related to descentralization, reward systems and governance systems.
Thank you for this massively detailed proposal Joe.
I think I’ve now (re)read all of the comments, plus also the comments under @kyle’s voter guide.
As always extremely impressed and inspired by the level of detail put in your proposals, I think the thoroughness of your approach & transparency can and should be an inspiration for any DAO.
I’ve spent quite a few days on mulling over whether I should abstain from voting or vote no - the way it currently stands I will probably vote no on the current budget. The main reasons for this are 1) the reserves which are requested and 2) the investments in innovation and governance within this workstream, which increase complexity and imo reduces effectiveness, at least at this point in our DAO’s timeline.
When I read the comments here - except for Kyle’s, who went for a hardcore deep dive - I think it shows that many people are supportive for one of two reasons: either they are a part of FDD and for this reason might be biased and/or see things I am missing, or they are stewards who appreciate the thoroughness of the FDD proposal and for this reason are supportive of the proposal, without actually understanding in detail what you are proposing and why.
It shows we still have a long way to go to incentivize Stewards to dive in and allocate enough time for these crucial decisions, and hopefully @Pop’s council proposal (WIP) will help on that level.
Both of these observations are very subjective and I am sure might rub some people the wrong way. I for my part can honestly say that I do not understand all of it, and it is one of the many reasons I am/was hesitating to vote, I simply do not have the time available to dig even deeper.
However, because of the large amount being requested, reading kyle’s observations combined with my own observations of the workings of FDD as a daily and full-time contributor within the DAO, and especially point 1) & 2) above I will probably vote no on this iteration of the budget.
Some more detail on my logic here:
FDD is the only workstream who has been ‘saving up’ and I think the argumentation shows we mainly need to work on getting rid of internal politics (which indeed do exist! and are very frustrating) and get better at DAOing. However, allowing these (enormous) reserves is counterproductive: it is basically saying that our governance mechanisms of allocating budgets are not working / cannot be trusted. To be honest I agree with that point The answer however imo is not to keep doing this & have funds ready to allow spinning out as a standalone DAO or to cease collaboration, but to work more on / invest more in the operations of the DAO as a whole, and improve our communication & governance mechanisms, as we have one shared/joint mission.
2) Innovation / Governance
Working within the DAO Operations Workstream I can say that there is a lot we need to do when it comes to effective governance, transparency and incentivization, there’s room for massive amounts of improvement & growth, and FDD has been leading the way here, because no one else was. However, I do not think these initiatives should be developed under FDD, they belong mostly under DAOops, which now exists and is slowly scaling.
This is not a question of centralization, it is even the opposite to me, as DAO Operations was created to service shared needs of the entire DAO. With certain elements of this proposal we are actually working towards a centralization of power within one workstream, and I think we are too early in the process of our own DAO (and all DAOs) to move this fast. Personally I think it could endanger the focus on the mission of Gitcoin, which is to build and fund public goods, not to become the most effective DAO.
Ideally one day we’ll be both.
I think this leaves plenty of room for innovation (also on topics of governance, eg the source council) and might be a signal for FDD to focus even more on its core mission, streamline for simplicity and effectiveness, and a signal for DAOops that it needs to really and urgently invest in better governance and incentivization modelling for the entirety of GitcoinDAO.
What you want to achieve within the boundaries of the budget that will remain - which is still around 50K GTC (!) counting the built-up reserves is still very ambitious.
I do believe every major city indeed needs its own fire department, and we have one, but we are not a big city just yet, we are a big name, but counting active (and effective) contributors, we are still a ‘baby DAO’, and we have already spent a lot of time on reducing internal politics aligning, in challenging times and a long-distance context, simplicity is key in order to continue on that path.
The vision for FDD is fantastic and I hope building a ‘sybil defense network for the metaverse’ is where we will arrive at. But let’s first make sure our city is thriving, viable & regenerative, before its fire department becomes a city on itself.
Note: I hope this feedback is useful and is interpreted the way it is intended: some constructive thoughts to help us achieve both our medium & long term goals, without stifling innovation or demotivating you or other contributors. I believe in moonshots and I believe even more in the need for a decentralized world, but I’ve also first-hand seen the risks & failures of bringing too many layers of complexity too soon.
I will not have the time to respond to comments on this in the way that Kyle has done above and under his summary because of Ethdenver and a number of other reasons. We can however discuss irl and will definitely read any comments if they appear here.
I think you are underestimating our Stewards. Some might have skimmed it, but take @akrtws for example. She is part of our multisig as a steward providing oversight of our workstream and is not a paid contributor of FDD. (FDD set ourselves up with a 4/7 multisig designed to represent our stakeholders and provide an additional layer of oversight which the other streams haven’t done.)
She participated in a 2 hour overview session giving very tough criticisms and then had multiple one on one discussions with myself and other contributors. After responding to her and other multisig keyholder critiques, we eventually got to this final request.
To say that she, or @bobjiang and other stewards are not fulfilling their duty if they support this budget request is not necessarily the case.
You have over 700k GTC delegated to you. I think it is your duty to understand it.
So you agree that mission critical work might be susceptible to these issues?
It is not new and we are not “saving up” we simply ask for one quarter of funding extra as we have been since the first budget proposal. If we were “saving up”, we wouldn’t explicitly be showing that we are topping up what we currently have to make sure we continue to have 1 season worth of reserves.
FDD is not spinning itself out as a standalone DAO. We have no interest of doing that. We may incubate projects that end up having a broader application potential than our mandate in which case we would support them spinning out. A community data collective for sybil detection for example.
I am 100% focused on serving FDD’s mandate which is defending Gitcoin against threats to its legitimacy, credible neutrality, and sustainability.
I fundamentally disagree that reserves for one season, another 90 days, makes it so FDD isn’t accountable for its results. Additionally, I will be bringing a proposal to CSDO before next season to establish a norm around reserves for all workstreams.
Quite frankly, I’m a little shocked that you, as the person responsible for contributor experience, feel as though the way to achieve accountability is by putting contributors financial stability and mental safety at a higher risk than necessary. 90 days of extra funding is not going to strip workstreams of accountability imho.
Or because we can’t supply legitimacy and credible neutrality without having a solid foundation. It would be wise to think of our need for proper governance structure as part of our mandate.
I agree that DAOops should own this for GitcoinDAO as a whole, but each stream does need to manage its own internal governance. We are explicitly working to do this well. This is less than 4% of our total budget. Whether or not a workstream explicitly identifies these needs in their budget does not mean it isn’t executing and paying for them.
Secondly, our governance process says that after 5 days on the governance forum and 5 steward comments, the proposal should move to snapshot. Even after getting the required amount of comments, our proposal is still not on snapshot 5 days later. (I could post, but I’m trying to go along with some hard work by @Pop to improve steward comms.)
The reason for this delay was cited as stewards requesting more time to review the proposals. No steward posted these requests on the governance forum or in the Stewards channel in Discord. Now, I am NOT accusing anyone of wrongdoing, but you could see how with you being the only steward who has commented during this delay period, one could be see this as delaying the vote so you could post this critique.
For this reason I think you should ABSTAIN from voting on this proposal.
Additionally, it shows the need for multiple workstreams to be actively involved in governance.
Please say more? How does FDD managing its own internal governance centralize power for all of GitcoinDAO?
Not sure how you make this connection.
How do you reconcile these two sentences? In one you state that we should not focus on becoming the most effective DAO, then you say that FDD should focus on streamlining our focus for simplicity and effectiveness.
Gitcoin has Top Level OKRs and one of them is decentralization. How do you come to the conclusion that FDD should focus on efficiency in the decentralization and efficiency tradeoff?
You know what stops little towns from becoming big cities… when they burn down.
How about we build all parts of the system to be regenerative individually and collectively. That is alignment.
The thesis of your criticism has not had anything to do with the introduction of complexity or the speed at which it is introduced. It has been about whether reserves are justified and who should own certain functions.
This sentence implies the FDD gets supported for a couple reasons that are not related to mission-first activity of fraud detection & defence. This statement is unsettling on several levels. Mostly it hints we are losing focus of the mission. Funding public goods & oss. Is this really suggesting the workstream dedicated to protecting the funding is only supported because 1)fdd members want to get paid and 2) Stewards like Joe’s writing ? Well I like to think people support the fdd because they don’t want funds going to bad actors. The fact Joe is a good writer only helps communicate the granular details to voters. This feels like somebody accusing an political party of gaining support only because they have a nice brochure. The brochure is just a proxy for the platform and ideology.
The talk around the FDD GR13 budget is illuminating. I see issues similar to the issues at hand when considering numerous grant applications from 1 large Dao. It is all about financial connection and accountability. Are the sub-daos routing money back to the parent dao? Are Gitcoin Dao workstreams routing funds to the greater Dao somehow? How is profit shared from each parent & sub dao? Now these issues are confronting GC as we debate budgets. I would like to know how much and by what manner Gitcoin GPG/LLC exerts control over those workstreams it funds. I was fairly surprised to learn that not all workstreams get equal support from the core.
Kris said the support shown by FDD members somehow means there is a lack of non-workstream member support. This is a reach imo. Something about correlation not equal to causation comes to mind. For Kris this translates into a reason he likely won’t support the budget. Did I land in bizzaro world somehow? Aren’t dedicated workstream participants a reason to increase budgets not decrease them? Personally want I the most leaned-in contributors to get the most budget and power.
Some workstreams get direct funding from the GPG? say what?!? I had no idea.
Some workstreams actively manage their treasury to create revenue. Nicely done! (but here comes the tax collector. The benefits of great treasury management should be awarded mainly to the workstream that created it imo. I could see allocating 20% back to the parent dao maybe.)
Some workstreams are thinking of spinning off into an independent dao. whoa. Feels like this is quite a divisive idea. Are we Gitcoin a nebulous group of linked mini-daos with narrow scopes? Or are we Gitcoin Dao - Funder of OSS and its Developers? I sure hope for the latter, but Ostrom seems to favor the former. Please educate me on why this is better.
Responsibility for innovation at Gitcoin is uncertain. Nobody seems to know who should push the innovation envelope beyond MSC. I think innovation is one of those org-wide topics that deserves org-wide guidance. In the absence of wide-spread guidance this responsibility falls on each workstream. I argue it is the workstream folks who are best suited to guide innovation within their stream’s mandate. FDD should guide FDD innovation. PGF should guide their own innovation. And so on. Would be great to get some input from the greater Steward group and GPG but until then we got you covered. The FDD has some innovation ideas evolved from many rounds of successful mission completion. Please don’t cancel these goals. It is too sudden and drastic imo. If there is some dissent, let’s discuss and shift some of these goals as the group deems proper. The suggestion to cut-off the innovation arm of the FDD comes without warning, without time to prepare for the transition and without thought of the FDD staff that are involved in these areas. If anything, cut the weakest innovation ideas, not the program itself. I’d love to see a Gitcoin survey about which areas of innovation are most favoured by the community. There are likely innovative experiments happening in workstreams that we don’t even know about yet.
Above all, I want to heartily thank Kyle, Kris and Joe for their time detail and commitment to Gitcoin. You folks demonstrate the ‘leaned-in’ behavior I try to mimic. The energy you three are giving the program is so admirable. Yes it is push-back, but that is what will make us lean and agile. Thank you <3. Also thank you to all the other commenters and folks dedicated to prudent money management at Gitcoin. We need you all.
I’ve decided to vote yes on this proposal even though I have reservations. In particular, the increase in the budget given that the budget is being driven from the ground up is concerning.
I realize this is probably the only way for the budget to be driven, given the early nature of the process, but a bottom-up budget that increases at this rate, I am sure everyone would agree, is unsustainable.
In the future, I will probably vote against a budget increase of this size (for any of the streams) without a much clearer “from-the-top” feeling for how it fits into the larger DAO’s mission / planning.
EDITED: I should have said how amazed I am with Joe’s energy, his positive attitude, his attention to details, and the huge amount of work he’s already put in. Nothing I say above is reflective of my thoughts on Decentrazation Joe or any of the team.
Before stewards vote, I’d like to offer a point of reconciliation in a hope to sway those pushing for a no vote. I’d like to offer a compromise to address the core reasons expressed for voting no after a nice heart to heart in Denver yesterday with @krrisis and a few shorter discussions with @kyle the past week.
ASK - I’d like you to be ok with our 90 days of reserves on this budget and vote YES as is
There isn’t a fundamental issue with the Season 13 budget at this point, but with the reserves.
The arguments against have not been about whether FDD is getting results and executing. They come from a place of concern with our rate of growth and the DAOs overall ability to assess the effectiveness of a workstream’s efforts. Combine this with the concern that the DAO as a whole hasn’t figured out how to prioritize budget between all of the workstreams.
I agree with these observations. I will address one at a time, then follow with my argument for the reserves.
Compromise 1 - We address the core issue of budget growth and rate of budget growth by agreeing that “structured streams” have a capped rate of budget growth (w/ specific CSDO override mechanism if needed)
During Season 13 we will work together to formulate a percentage cap to the allowable growth rate cap for structured streams. We will also formally set the requirements for being a “structured” or “semi-structured” stream and the benefits a workstream may receive for participating in CSDO governance.
Compromise 2 - We will collaborate to improve the DAOs overall ability to assess the effectiveness of a workstream’s efforts
The FDD Mandate Delivery squad is tasked with determining the effectiveness and health of FDD initiatives. While I believe each workstream should be able to track this on their own, it would be great to take the learnings from our effort which is needed sooner because of our mission critical functions, then collaborate to design a framework to be owned by DAOops in the future.
This could include spinning out this squad to DAOops for Season 14 or simply reducing these efforts from around 4% of FDD total budget to < 1%.
Compromise 3 - We collaborate to figure out a framework to prioritize budget between all of the workstreams
We can collaborate on a framework for providing this context to the entire DAO in the future.
As for this budget proposal, FDD is only asking for 60-70k GTC for season 13 (depending on GTC price). This is not the largest seasonal budget request, or the second largest. However, solving sybil resistance (ensuring each vote is a unique human) and grant eligibility (community curation of consent to participate) are the two of the most important problems for Gitcoin to solve.
Because of the importance of these efforts, it seems that our relative prioritization is reasonable for this season before we agree to the new framework.
My argument on why reserves are reasonable
I believe not having reserves is both operationally a potential problem, but also detrimental to contributors mental health and financial stability. I think we are all in agreement that the workstreams could still be held accountable even if they have more than 90 days of operating budget at a time.
My argument is that ALL workstreams should have at least 90 days of runway at a any given time. We shouldn’t back them into a corner.
With the current system, contributors can only plan expectations of an income for 90 days at the beginning of a season. At the end, they might only be able to plan a few weeks or days into the future. (Right now for example, most workstreams would be in the red if they actually executed and uses the budget they requested for Season 12.)
With my suggestion, even in the last days of the season, a structured workstream would benefit from having 90 days of financial stability at the end of each quarter rather than at the beginning.
Yes, it is an assumption that they will execute. I think this is reasonable as we can set the requirements for being a structured workstream to include a level of earning this trust. (Maybe after a first trial season, they get this right?)
I’d encourage us to assess whether this would be appropriate for all workstreams during the upcoming season and before s14 proposals as part of this compromise.
Thank you both for your attention, professionalism, and honest feedback.
Finally, I am appreciated Kyle and Kris to comment the S13 budget proposal, and they are valid and specific feedbacks. (At the same time, it makes GitcoinDAO’s issues visible like the corporations between workstreams etc)
Holy molly guys, I wanted to respond to this topic earlier but could not find the time and since then it has exploded with comments.
Before saying anything else I want to express my disappointment at this statement directed at @krrisis.
As a steward with lots of GTC delegated to me too who is actually trying to put as much of my free time as possible reading through proposals and voting and keeping up to date with what’s happening I find this really unfair.
I have spent quite a few hours per week on this DAO since its inception, and wasted lots of gas in proposals and votes and multisig actions. All of this without receiving a wei in compensation for my time. Not even gas rebates.
Having GTC delegated to me does not pay me in any way for my time which is quite very limited. So no I don’t think it’s my, or any other steward’s duty to do anything unless we start getting paid and also have a contractual relation with the DAO.
I realize this is quite different to the view I had when I first started being a steward but I had seriously underestimated the amount of pro bono work this would require when the DAO was starting.
Amount of funds
Now for the proposal itself. I also find it really hard to be asked to judge how much money other people should get from the DAO, how much their work is worth when all of this judgement on my and fellow delegates side is supposed to be pro bono.
For the amount of funds the salaries look high to me as a European but I understand probably are okay for American standards.
For the reserves I also find it really weird a given workstream of the DAO would need any sort of reserves. So long as the DAO has funds, the workstreams would be funded by the DAO as long as they do their work.
Having reserves sounds like FDD wants to spin into its own organization completely which I find alarming. I think this may outline a politics and communication problem inside the Gitcoin DAO.
I would much rather prefer to see Gitcoin DAO as a whole figure out a way to make sure all its employees have no disruptions in their payments through a common and unified approach rather than have a single workstream have such big reserves.
FDD Peformance Review
I am always on and reading in the discord ocassionally and have read all the material provided here. It is my impression that FDD is doing a good job and is helping Gitcoin grants a lot. The ideas pushed by @kyle about having another customer too sound also interesting.
What I would also like to see though is a performance review of the FDD made by another workstream or DAO member. Since all the material I have read are actually made by FDD they could be biased. So would be nice to see an independent performance review.
This is more of a comment on all workstreams though, not just FDD. It would be nice to have some kind of formal review process to which all workstreams would fall under. And the result of this review would be created by a person/group external to the reviewed workstream and would be perhaps easier to read by the stewards who would know.
I am under the impression that FDD is doing a good job.
In closing I have not yet made up my mind completely on how I will vote as there is some things I have doubts for as mentioned above.
An extra question to @DisruptionJoe as I am not 100% sure which number I should look for in the spreadsheets but how long can this conversaion and voting drag on? How long do you have reserves for to pay the team?
Valid point, same here. Being a steward/multisig keyholder is not sustainable in the current set up. But let’s not punish FDD for this problem, since it’s not their mistake. I’m grateful that this discussion is coming up, and I’ll be glad to see the roles evolve.
The voting on the this season’s FDD budget is pending because of this discussion. Proves that there can be situations when a buffer is needed. I think it’s smart to prepare for such situations, because there’s a risk of loosing really critical contributors due to such delays - be it at FDD or any other work stream.
Valid route to solve this issue, let’s address it.
Yes to that - adds to the need to further develop Gitcoin DAO roles.
Many of the issues mentioned in this whole discussion (role definitions, reserves, timelines, reviewing process) are caused by the fact that the organisational set up obviously didn’t keep pace with the workstreams’ development.
What if you were an ambitious, skilled contributor watching the DAO fail to assess a proposal properly and as a result your proposal was turned down in the voting? You’d probably look for a better place to invest your time.
Let’s not make steward/multisig issues the problem of a workstream. And please let’s not punish FDD or any other Gitcoin DAO workstream for being fast and ambitious.