I want to request clarification on some key points. Is it correct that:
The existence of the âsurplusâ FDD funds was made publicly known in a public and recorded Stewards council meeting.
Many Stewards voted on FDD funding without doing due diligence and information-gathering, i.e. attending the meeting or reading the transcript.
An unprecedented revote is being enacted on sentiment analysis of the basis of about ten forum posts, absent any provision in any existing GitCoin governance document.
If these are the facts, then my personal view is that a revote is completely illegitimate and sets a terrible precedent regarding the ability of individuals to simply assert decisions through personal will. It borders on the Tyranny of Structurelessness.
Is there a clear model of the desired information flow in GitCoin governance, and of who bears what responsibility for that flow?
Specifically, what are the official records that Stewards are expected to be familiar with before voting? Are Stewards expected to know what has occurred in meetings relevant to their votes?
I understand that some Stewards have expressed that they have little bandwidth. But, I donât understand how this is possible: all human beings are equal in the fact that we all have 24 hours of bandwidth per day.
I think ultimately that there need to be clear standards and expectations regarding what constitutes effective disclosure of relevant information, so that we can determine whether a standard of clear information availability has been met.
Additionally, Iâm not sure if I have standing to raise points in this discussion, since I sold my all of my GitCoin this week. But, as a DAO and mechanism researcher, I am still interested in the answers to the above questions, and clarity regarding the situation.
As described above, this case illustrates a gap in our governance processes. Finding such gaps are not uncommon and this will not be the last time we find new challenges to deal with.
Using existing tools, and leaning heavily on Robertâs Rules of Order NR, I built a reconsideration process that can help Gitcoin navigate cases like this.
I do not presume my proposed path is perfect for this and all future circumstances, but it could give us a framework from which to start. I welcome any and all input in on that draft post so that we can find an equitable and non-acrimonious solution to this and future cases.
Really appreciate your writing this. I appreciate that you posted it on Twitter.
This is more than a single issue. It sets a precedent for the GitCoin DAO. that will likely influence other DAOs in the future.
I would encourage that the discussion be publicized widely, at least within GitCoin DAO. My guess is that relatively few people realize a major governance question is emerging in a forum discussion on a vote that was already settled.
This is really great work. One suggestion: CSDO doesnât have any legitimacy in this context. The steward council would serve as a better appellate court because their legitimacy comes from the token holders.
I would like for us to take the time to do this right. The nature of the problem also allows us to take time without immediate financial worries for FDD.
Iâd echo Octopus sentiment. Our governance says that a snapshot vote is final. If you look at Uniswap, 100% of their snapshot votes are enacted on Tally. Do we want to be the ones to change this precedent for the ecosystem based on a few posts on the forum rather than a legitimate process? How do we remain leaders in legitimacy after that?
Hey Joe, thanks for the comment. With everyone I am in touch with regarding this situation, I try to draw a line between this example, and the proposed process to deal with this example. I find doing that places a layer of abstraction between contention and good governance design. This being the case, I moved responses to this to the proposal thread.
Just want to come back to this (after reading comments) and provide a bit more context regarding my position:
I have full confidence in Joeâs integrity, that he has been acting in good faith, and that he is deeply committed to serving Gitcoin DAO and its community. I hope no one see this process as a referendum on one personâs intentions.
I have deep respect for the work FDD has provided to the DAO over the years and the impact it has had on Sybil defense (both practically, by preventing attacks during rounds, and through its thought leadership / experimentation) and in the data community. I also hope no one sees this as a referendum on the value or legitimacy of FDDâs work.
It is normal for organizations to refactor / reorg. Given the market conditions PLUS the fact that the DAO is transitioning from cGrants to a protocol stack, it makes sense to examine the role of âserviceâ workstreams like FDD and question whether the current structure is optimal. As a Steward looking in, my impression is that this could have been communicated / executed better. However, since learning of the plan to dissolve FDD after S17, my position has been to advocate for an orderly and full season-long transition.
I donât have a strong opinion (yet) on whether workstreams should have âgray fundsâ or what happens to those funds in the event of a workstream dissolving. It appears the DAO is divided on this issue. As Joe and others have said, this should be clarified and made more explicit. That work feels urgent. But I wouldnât make a decision and then try to apply it retroactively to FDDâs case. From my perspective, FDD can do what it wants to with those funds â but they should be exhausted or at least fully earmarked by the end of S17.
I do believe the presence of those funds was material information to Stewards. Sure, the funds were not hidden, but the salient issue is that they were not mentioned as a source FDD could draw upon for completing its S17 budget. In effect, FDD had the choice of funding a full S17 by tapping its gray fund OR requesting an allocation from the treasury and preserving the gray fund so it could be used for something else at the end of the season (eg, a Joke Race).
Finally, on the question of the revote, I am happy to see that this is moving towards a resolution here. Hopefully there are important communication and governance lessons we all gain from this. I would hate to see revotes become a common thing or a new layer of bureaucracy added to decision-making.
I hope people find my comments constructive. I appreciate all of the commentary in this thread and hope this ends up being a net positive in the long run for GTC governance.
I will keep it short. I also was not aware of the extra funds when voting in favour of this, and since the workgroup is dissolving and has enough funds to dissolve I donât understand why more was needed.
Questions about Intent to deceive and pages and pages of drama is not something I am going to go in.
On 3.20 this proposal was referred to the Steward Council for a reconsideration by @kevin.olsen, a member of CSDO. Following the newly defined process, it will be reviewed in the next Steward Council meeting for consideration. I will post the outcome of that discussion in this thread.
Quick update:
The steward council met on 3.27 and voted to reconsider the vote on the S17 FDD budget. This effectively means the snapshot vote for the S17 FDD budget is null and void. FDD budget owner @DisruptionJoe does comment on his intentions moving forward and you can see the discussion in the recording below (starting at about 3:13.
you can see a recording of the meeting `here
And you can see the notes of the meeting here
Thank you to the Gitcoin Steward council members who were present, and cast their vote.
Thank you for all your hard work to make this happen. While I still disagree with the outcome, I do feel that the process for making the decision was fair and legitimate.
I will not be posting the budget again as FDD does have the funds to finish the season and we are already well down that path.
Hey Joe - Do whats does this actually mean? I think we discovered FDD does have âgrey fundsâ and those cold be used to finish out the season (not saying they have to be, but want to get a bit of context)?
Where do those âgrey fundsâ go once FDD dissolves?
IIRC, dCompass kept their excess funds after spinning down as a workstream as they were working to finish up the product they were building and felt they may still have a go to market path without additional WS funds. What are you thinking for FDDâs case?
I delayed posting a FAQ about this as I was trying to gather all the details. You beat me to it! My intention is to get it up this Monday.
TL;DR
We are planning to execute on almost everything in the Season 17 budget as posted. It seemed that we had alignment on the work to be done, just not if FDD should be given more funds to do it.
We have $30-60k left which FDD will vote on how to use to further its mission. These will likely be used dogfooding Allo protocol.
5/10 have transfer plans which will be outlined on the FAQ - Most of these are paid by FDD through 4/28 although they transfer accountability on 4/3 - Its a hand held process
Those who arenât moving on had final dates set according to work they are responsible for and severence based on time/postition with Gitcoin.
We do hope for other opportunities for individuals to participate in the ecosystem through GCPs and building some of the first service orgs on the protocol! More details TBD.
