[GCP-003] - PASSED - Post-vote “reconsider” process

[shawn16400]

Picking comments up here from the FDD thread:

[S17 Proposal] INTEGRATED FDD Budget Request

This is really great work. One suggestion: CSDO doesn’t have any legitimacy in this context. The steward council would serve as a better appellate court because their legitimacy comes from the token holders. I would like for us to take the time to do this right. The nature of the problem also allows us to take time without immediate financial worries for FDD. I’d echo Octopus sentiment. Our governance says that a snapshot vote is final. If you look at Uniswap, 100% of their snapshot votes are …

@DisruptionJoe

This is really great work. One suggestion: CSDO doesn’t have any legitimacy in this context. The steward council would serve as a better appellate court because their legitimacy comes from the token holders.

I agree there are two options here for this review, CSDO and the Steward Council and both have advantages and disadvantages. Lets hit the highlights:

CSDO has greater history, it has better internal context, and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. However, it is not an elected body, it is comprised of Gitcoin insiders, and the CSDO charters states that its decision space includes “DAO-wide governing agreements (except what’s passed to Snapshot vote)”. (link)

The Steward Council includes independent external-to-Gitcoin members, it is an elected + appointed body, it include executive thinkers from outside Gitcoin, and it includes some of the highest context members internal to Gitcoin. However, the Steward Council is a new experiment, the effectiveness of the body has not yet to be proven, and it was setup up as an advisory body without decision rights. (link)

As a governance thinker, I am ok with either body acting as a stop-gap measure knowing it is the voters who will decide the ultimate outcome. Over time, if the Steward Council experiment proves resilient, moving this kind of case to the that body would seem like a normal maturation.

@DisruptionJoe

Our governance says that a snapshot vote is final. If you look at Uniswap, 100% of their snapshot votes are enacted on Tally. Do we want to be the ones to change this precedent for the ecosystem based on a few posts on the forum rather than a legitimate process? How do we remain leaders in legitimacy after that?

We would not be the first DAO to enact a stopgap measure between on and off chain voting. Maker for example has a “cooling off period” post-vote in which time a stop to a vote could be triggered by a whale or collection of whales. Their process requires the burning of MKR and to my knowledge has never been used, but it exists.

This being said, legitimacy is derived from 1) having a defined process 2) following that process dispassionately and 3) changing / ratifying a process when the need presents itself. This proposal attempts to do just that.