Awesome work @DisruptionJoe and the whole stream! The granularity given into the thought for the next Q is really great! Been a part of FDD for half a year now, and I really love the discussions phase that everything goes through before finalizing things, that part, specifically, makes me believe in the direction we are moving to realize the decentralized future!
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Love the âsource councilâ experiment, Joe
One more comment is âwould you share the KR scores every month?â (like the OKR tool)
There are detailed plan and clear squad in FDD work stream, and clear OKR settings.
So as multi-sig holder, definitely I would support FDD for season 13.
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Yes Bob. In our FDD Weekly Update meetings (which are open to everyone to watch) each outcome owner covers their recent accomplishments, what they are working on this week, their issues, blockers and shoutouts.
Each 90 day KR is self judged by the outcome owner as Green = gonna hit it, Yellow = at risk, Red = Donât think we can make it.
The 90 day krs are used for a bonus portion of source council pay that is dependent on all of the OKRs being hit. For example, if we complete 80% of the OKRs, then we all get 80% of our potential bonus amount. This incentivizes individual outcome owners to report accurately and the other source council members to step up to help where there are issues.
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This is a huge increase. Were there materially large changes to the Algos that we are using to detect these? Have we gone back through GR11 data to see if the new algo would catch missed sybil in GR11?
This is pretty immense (the number of outcomes you are driving towards). There are only 12 listed in the proposal, are there another 6 missing from the proposal?
There is an interesting evolution of FDD that is unlike other workstreams. When I look at PGF, which is arguably the heart and soul of the DAO, they are modeling much of their work off of a similar ethos to what Peter Pan has talked about.
The entire DAO will be organized as sub-DAOs and ideally two-pizza teams:
PGF has three/four âsub-DAOsâ (lets call them sub streams) that have less than 5 people per sub stream who are compensated. This structure lacks the same level of anti fragility, but also offers accountability on outcome with more budget efficiency. (more on this below)
I really like the council idea and commend you for trying this out. The Incentivization on showing up on time is a great way to align participant incentives to the outcomes you want (punctual attendance to run efficient meetings!) This approach seems like it would create an accounting nightmare though. The complexity in tracking and paying people feels rather burden some. This is my opinion on the cumbersome accounting, but I am interested in seeing how this works out.
As I dig into the roadmap you have linked and outlined, this summary at the top really stands out:
The FDD workstream budget was approved and began to decentralize the process by having the community take over responsibility of approving grant eligibility, paying contributors to evaluate grants and accounts flagged as sybil by the ML algorithm, and even paying the contracts to SMEs guiding the machine learning efforts
The future of sybil detection includes a âcommunity data lakeâ with anonymized data allowing data scientists anywhere to compete to find the best models using an open-source feature engineering pipeline. Sybil accounts will be detected across Ethereum addresses, DIDs, and Gitcoin accounts. Eventually, meta-models will give even greater insights.
This was the dream we had for the workstream in its inception, and reading this blog post was a great and inspiring refresher of the dreams we held when launching the workstream. I am really torn on if now is the right time for us to expand to the great vision this budget is advocating for (and if we should be paying for three teams to build ML models, for anti fragile and evaluation purposes)
Frankly, Itâs a moonshot. Going straight from crawl, to run⌠scaling immensely to hit strides, build out the data lake, scale ML teams, all while creating an operating system and operations layer to manage it all.
when is the right time for FDD to seek additional customers to validate this vision?
This vision was born based on a single teamâs needs (Gitcoinâs Grants development team) and continuing to fund it without confirmation on a broader market need feels like we are gold plating a system that is for a single customer. I am interested in acting in good faith and continuing to fund as is for S13, but I would request more feedback before funding in S14. I am also happy to help as much as I can to make intros and help validate this as I love the vision!
this is another example where we are building and scaling without stopping to evaluate how to solve the problem from first principles. For example, have we considered requiring 25 DAI to be staked per new grant request to help increase the fraud tax on this process? If so, apologizes for throwing stones, I do worry that scale has been the default state for FDD (in many cases for good reason, as it reduces fragility).
When I review the budget, It looks like roughly $596K is budgeted for, but your request is asking for twice this (roughly) - why the reserves? Further, there are folks that seem to potentially be getting double paid on the ground control budget.
Here is my take as a single steward who has tried to really dig in and understand the proposal.
- The Ground Control work seems like it may be duplicative. As some of that work is being covered/compensated by DAO Ops. I would strike most of that budget if I am being prudent.
- I would also deny the reserves. FDD has been a great steward of the budgets it has received and the reserves feel unnecessary.
- GIA seems like the wrong solution to the problem, but I would leave that $75K budget intact with the hopes of us partnering with GPG to build in a staking model in GR14, or another software based hurdle (recognizing a change for GR13 is likely too aggressive).
- Sybil Defenders budget seems pretty heavy, but I am not an expert in how to cut there. Knowing BlockScience is at least half the cost here, it would be great to get the model owned by the DAO so that those funds could be re appropriated⌠right now it feels like we are double paying, but I am fine with that if there is an end in sight. I would advocate strongly that we do not continue to fund the Block Science requirement in S14 as we would have funded all the work necessary for the community to take this over in S13.
- I would also leave Source Council as is as I really appreciate the though that went into crafting the experiment. It seems to be a primary funding mechanism for contributions and I would love to see how it evolves and what FDD learns.
Given this, I would personally like to see a budget request closer to $555K. With $313K in reserves, an actual request of $275K (35K GTC) feels more than sufficient even with some price volatility.
This assumes that in S14, we can reduce costs as the âdouble paymentâ for BSCI and Community run models goes away, the GIA work is hopefully greatly reduced (if GPG can help build staking into grant creation or some other software deterrent to the deluge of new spammy grants), and DAO Ops continues to support and fund work that FDD relies on (DevOps, Consulting, Accounting, etc.)
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No. There was some code refactoring for performance but no substantial updates to the code. Although we did increase our number of human evaluations up to 6,000 which lets us know that our statistical validation of the model is more accurate.
There are 18 listed here in the budget request details. This is 3 top level outcomes with nested OKRs for outcomes owned by individual squads (each of which could grow to be itâs own subdao).
The average top level goal has an âessential intentâ for the âsubdaoâ which is a guiding statement for the next 12 - 18 months. For example, Grants Investigation agency has an essential intent of âIncreasing legitimacy and transparency in the grant eligibility processesâ. This has 3 metrics which can tell us if we are improving quarter to quarter. Both the essential intent and these metrics will be reviewed each quarter to determine if the direction is still appropriate.
Then, within the Grants Investigation Agency, there are 5 outcomes that bubbled up from our strategy sessions. Each of these outcomes has a driver. They selected their KRs for us to measure their success over the next 90 days.
Each of these subdaos (grants, sybil, ops) easily has a 2 pizza team. The core of each is small with maybe 6-10 key contributors. The reason FDD has such large contributor numbers is because we have the human evaluations and grants reviews which pay a large number of people relatively small amounts.
FDD basically has 3 subdaos each with 3 source council members (Full time) and maybe 3-4 part time contributors. This seems the same to me. I think our difference is that we structured in a way that contributors that participate in any one of the 3 subdaos can easily bounce between the 3.
I think the Peter Pan one is basically what we mimic and are moving to as seen in our roadmap of progressive decentralization. I think it is also important to understand that this can be fractal.
Why else are we here? Governments and institutions no longer pay for the moonshots and R/D needed for public infrastructure. A sybil defense network is a base level public good for the metaverse. Itâs like having a fire dept. Unless your town is super small, you need one. Additionally, all the advancements made by the big ones will be open source and free for the smaller town fire departments to build upon.
In the modular, extendable, plug-in architecture we are discussing for dGrants with aqueducts driving the donations, defending the legitimacy and credible neutrality of a round through sybil detection and grant curation is the most likely reason any org will have to create an aqueduct next to the goodness of their collective hearts.
Less abstract - Yes, we are moving all the blockscience work to be run by the DAO. Yes, we are funding 2 distinct models right now. Yes, we need them if we want to scale. One is entirely focused on being the main one we operationalize during the round. The other is figuring out how to get unknown community contributors to be able to participate at various access levels to collaboratively build and update the features and eventually the model itself.
Sure, we could save money by not running these in parallel, but why would we do that? We are building public goods that the world needs. It is public infrastructure that wonât get funded anywhere else which will enable a cambrian explosion of innovation in how we allocate resources.
The idea that we should âcut the fatâ because we CAN run the operations on a smaller budget rather than take the moonshot that could solve the problem properly is the mindset and incentive model that drove web 2 to be extractive. imho. We, Gitcoin, users and stakeholders are here to build a better way.
Once this is built, the business model is not that of web 2. (Finding customers and extraction)
The business model is that the matching pool will grow through aqueducts and donations which choose Gitcoin because we can offer the turn key services with legitimacy.
The treasury will grow via more people recognizing our values and seeing that groups like FDD, Moonshot, PGF, etc deliver. We turn their capital into public good. They can either donate and lose their capital or they can participate by holding GTC and letting the DAO catalyze their capital into impact.
The gitcoin stakeholders will grow as the many subdaos mature. Some will have customers, some will need governance, some will find their role being closer to knowing how to solve problems rather than solving problems.
https://gov.gitcoin.co/t/the-gitcoin-anti-sybil-flywheel/9417
Yes it is. The mandate of FDD is to defend Gitcoin. When Gitcoin no longer needs this service, or doesnât want it from us, then it should simply dissappear. However, the people who are participating as contributors can continue to organize.
Iâve been told we shouldnât be looking for customers or thinking about our own business models in the past, but it seems like the thinking around that is coming around the corner now. (Probably, because it is inevitable for every subdao)
Sybil detection across web 3 will require itâs own incentive mechanism at some point rather than relying on Gitcoin funding it. How do we get that conversation started? (One of our sybil outcomes is to get buy in from community partners to share data for features in a community data lake)
Yes. We did consider it and still are considering it. (It says that further down in the tl;dr.) Staking and any incentive design choice can have 2nd and 3rd order effects we might not foresee. Therefore, we have been doing the research to know that we are making the best decisions we can before making them.
Yes. We have done the reserves every budget and explain in the budget that part of our work is mission critical and we donât want to be unable to perform due to political hiccups or other unknown issues that might come up. I donât think a 6 month budget, especially after having done this and not only been responsible, but made gains ($70k) through treasury management. (Only GTC, Eth, stables)
There is one person who was moved to DAOops who is getting a weekly amount from this stream. How many streams can you assign to that person without increasing their pay?
Are there others?
Exactly what part of the Ground Control budget is duplicative? Iâll list them all here to make it easier to discuss. (Format = Outcome Name (Outcome owner) | S13 Outcome Budget Total = % of FDD S13 Total Budget)
Payments (Joe) | $6.5k = 1.1%
Contributors are paid on-time and understand how their payments work
This $500/wk is going to the person handling all of FDD payments.
FDD OS (Joe) | $10k = 1.7%
Contributors all have a voice in a self managing system
We need someone to drive the operationalizing of having this system. Initial setup and organization first. Tracking steps and creating runbooks for it to work. Plus some expert guidance and help here and there.
Contributor UX (SirL) | $14k = 2.3%
Contributors understand their role, responsibilities, know how to show up and put a participation âLevel Requiredâ effort toward the mission
This is NOT duplicative to the GitcoinDAO onboarding as FDD has certain info, needs, and rituals we have with our contributors. Learnings from FDD have been brought into other streams before too.
Mandate Delivery (Kish) | $14k = 2.5%
FDD effectiveness in delivering on its mandate is easy to communicate
FDD needs to know how well its outcome owners are performing and how well it is doing on delivering itâs mandate. If the models we create work, then the rest of the DAO could use them
Contributor CAP (Waka) | $4k = 0.7%
Model and simulation is available to analyze collective decision outcome variations
For us to launch bottoms up initiatives, this is critical info.
Data Storage Layer (Nollied) | $22k = 3.7%
Contributors can easily access data without compromising security
I think this one is obvious, it would probably spin off to DAOops soon, but FDD needs it and DAOops didnât include it in their budget nor did they start a conversation with us about it. We canât just not perform our core function because another stream âshouldâ own the work.
Data Analytics (Omni) | $10k = 1.7%
Collect and repurpose data analysis for continuous insights
Right now we are doing a lot of one-off analysis that get used once and then thrown out. Kevin had a bounty for data analysis on grants. We could take the great code people write and collect it to setup dashboards to run a data report after every round with the same set of insights people found in the bounty rather than look at it once and forget it.
Overall, I donât see anything overlapping except the one person who we should discuss in the payments.
I would not deny the reserves. In fact, Iâd recommend that every workstream participating in CSDO guidelines add reserves to their budgets.
There are two problems here. Staking solves one of them, GIA software solves another.
Staking, how might we raise the cost of fraud for registering sybil grants? or HMW decrease likelihood of sybil attackers making new grants?
GIA software, how might we dynamically let communities determine and update the inclusion criteria for an ecosystem, cause, or round, and then curate grants according to the dynamic policy? or HMW allow self curation of criteria and grants by the community?
This is our plan going forward. However, we may want to continue working with Blockscience in other ways.
Awesome. We are very excited to do this.
I appreciate your feedback but for reasons listed above I donât agree. Our defense budget is rising by 34% while the round totals are rising at 50-100%. We are also still early and investing in a better future. Your recommendation seems to be to cut all the innovation and only fund the items needed to operationally run a round.
I think a good goal for FDD is to continue to lower our rate of budget growth. Last round was 50%, this one 34%. To do this while supporting defense of Gitcoin Grants which is growing at an exponential pace seems to be a good place to be.
Iâd encourage stewards to look at what we set out to do and if we achieve those goals. FDD has been incredibly transparent and has set very clear top level goal metrics to improve round over round and clear OKRs for each outcome funded to keep us accountable.
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Big fan of the work that is being done by this group. The little window I have had into this workstream through working on the GIA project has inspired me by what is possible in this space. What a great breakdown of all that is involved Joe. Couldnât support this more. Canât wait to see all the epic stuff coming from this team in the season ahead.
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I see the logic of a staking model but I worry that would create additional friction for donations when we are trying to reduce friction and onboard more people.
Also this doesnât address the subtlety of decisions that are not cut and dry. There is still a need for reviewers and having a process to do the review that is transparent and inclusive Reduces the pressure and responsibility on any small group of individuals. It also provides a model for greater decentralization of this kind of process and provides opportunities for meaningful participation for DAO members.
Of course Iâm biased because Iâm involved in the project but I wanted to add more context for discussion.
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FDD is vital to Gitcoin and Joe is a public good.
Love this thorough overview - it has my support. Thanks for putting this together!
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Joe is a public good 
Maybe even a public great
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Chiming in here on the latest FDD budget, some of the numbers that have been presented are truly impressive 
great work here team.
- Increased human evaluations completed to over 6,000 - a 320% increase!
- Sybil attack rate jumped from around 6% of total contributions in GR11 to 26% in GR12 and FDD flagged 114,000 of them
- We currently have 18 outcomes for the next 90 days. Each outcome has 3 measurable key results that will determine if we achieved the outcome.
Regarding this specific portion of the proposal:
Season 13 is $155k increase = 34% budget increase
Given that the work-stream has proven itâs responsibility with the previous budget and has delivered on all itâs stated goals to date I would say the 34% increase is well justified, based on the overall decrease from the 50% increase of the last season.
I think a good goal for FDD is to continue to lower our rate of budget growth. Last round was 50%, this one 34%. To do this while supporting defense of Gitcoin Grants which is growing at an exponential pace seems to be a good place to be.
Complexity builds, sybil attacks are increasing, thus the size of the team and the value of their work is increasing. We must keep that in mind as we scale up.
an increase of 34% to our budget seems justified. Especially considering the rate at which the sybil attacks are increasing (300-400%)
Personally I think this is essential ecosystem infrastructure and we need to double down on these efforts to ensure that we are keeping the contributors well compensated for their work, while keeping an eye towards the progressive decentralization of the work-streams, which @DisruptionJoe has been doing a kick-ass job at thus far 
My feeling is that we need to trust the work-stream leads and rally behind them at this time, approve the budget set out so that they can keep driving towards their goals.
I donât see any double spending as far as mentioned for contributors and furthermore if that were the case Iâm positive we could solve with a simple policy of base wages from a single stream or a flexible compensation plan that utilized coordinape or some other such tool. It is common in this space for people transitioning from one team to another to have a honeymoon period where they receive rewards for contributing on multiple fronts, but that needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis as some people are simply capable of doing more and deserve to be compensated at such a rate. Again I leave that decision up to the work-stream leads to solve internally and I donât intent to review all their deliverables. They will self regulate their budget and have autonomy in how to apply it, or the entire fluid nature of the DAO and itâs work-streams will revert back into some draconian accounting nightmare from the Web2 era.
FDD deserves the full budget requested and the reserves, to cut the budget at this time and reduce the spend simply because we can work at half capacity seems to work against our goals of pushing towards high impact outcomes and providing equitable compensation for this diverse group of contributors who have clearly proven their worth to the DAO.
In terms of moving towards a more sustainable and incentive driven approach to funding this stream, I think itâs a bit to early to introduce anything like that, but when the time is right trust me I will be at the ready to bring the right supportive partners & orgs into a discussion about this topic and itâs overarching utility to the entire grants ecosystem.
I know @DisruptionJoe has already applied some of his early thinking around this for review from members of the MetaCartel and our associated grant pipelines, FDD has been committed to defending Gitcoin in itâs mission to Fund Public Goods and we must continue supporting the efforts of their contributors as they scale up their operations and streamline their contributor incentive mechanisms.
Thanks for all the work you guys do, & the thoughtful comments on it by others in this thread 
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I love this question, and I think tools like dPoPP may help. Also, introducing staking on identity (even outside of dPoPP) could offer an income source that also incentives participants to hunt for Sybils. I would love to brainstorm more of this.
I donât think this pay is a problem as well as each workstream understands its happening. I was under the impression contributions form DAO Ops were also covering this work. I am fine with splitting payments (and making sure a fair total salary is in place). I am less interested in each workstream negotiating with people what they believe is a full time compensation just to find out later they are getting paid by others as well. Now, this is really tricky when we evaluate the performance of individuals who may be participating in other DAOs as well. Itâs rare any one person can work two FT jobs, and deliver results as if they were.
I understand we differ here. No other WS is requesting this, and this tells me it is not a DAO wide norm, but something unique to FDD. I am down to chat about this at CSDO and see if we want to adopt a new standard like this in the future.
This is really great. I didnât realize this was a capability of the system. Have we used GIA to do this yet, or is this future state we are talking about?
I think we better aligned in the other thread, but just for folks here. I am actually not calling for any budget reduction, I am advocating for the elimination of the reserves and using some of the current reserves.
I do think the comparison to round size and your budgets is a red herring. Other Workstreams have not grown in the same way, despite being the ones who are running, marketing, programmatically supporting the rounds.
I appreciate that I am a single voice, and I am highly supportive if other stewards want to fund as is. I am merely calling out adjustments I would like to see in order to support the proposal. (and trying to seek context for myself and the benefit of others). I have learned a lot about FDD as part of this review, and I am more excited for the work that is happening as a result.
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That is why there should be clear and measurable outcomes. I donât need to worry about whether that person is also working for another DAO if I have onboarded well and leveled up an individuals access to opportunities. They are delivering or not delivering.
Now of course we will ask and in FDD I work to coach the outcome owners to assess this BEFORE commiting. One advantage of the way FDD works is an outcome owner can say, âyou seem great, we have 4 hours a week available for youâ then they can determine if that person fits within a week or two. Imagine you own the outcome of going through all the current grant eligibility policy and deduping/updating it. When you present your weekly accomplishments to all of FDD on Monday, you will probably want to update your team to be successful.
There is also a DAO vibe similar to the old saying, âOnly look in your neighbors cup to see if they have enough.â
This round we are moving from using GIA for the disputes only, to using it for all the approvals of new grants. Next round we will probably focus on dynamic criteria to adapt it for side rounds.
Another cool part of that is we could use it for other things too. Things like filtering proposals, community assessment of work quality, and even reviews of new DAO contributor applications.
We have a clear difference of opinion here, but arenât as far off as I initially thought we were. I do believe that FDD has a norm of receiving the reserves. Iâd argue that instead of a brand new steward (lol) pushing us to change our norms, we use your suggestion and have CSDO discuss and present a unified solution prior to Season 14.
This seems reasonable to me because we have:
- a proven track record of not abusing the reserves in the past
- $70k in treasury management gains last season (more than the entire DAO combined)
- High transparency - Perhaps the most transparency of any workstream (DAOops, which uses our system or maybe moonshot, but it is onchain rather than human readable)
Honestly, thank you for your time. I felt a little blindsided at first because we didnât discuss this before getting to the public forum, but I think you made the right decision to post this and follow up on every thread. It is a good example of the behavior we would like to see from all stewards!
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In fact, Sybill resistance is vital to many DAOs, and many are struggling how to protect their decision making and reward systems!
Proves a) the value produced in FDD work stream - and b) yes, agree - letâs explore how to make this a building block for Web3, and (yes!) a component in Gitcoin value streams and token utility.
I support that FDD work stream aims for the moonshot version because of the opportunities here - and Iâm looking forward to see progress towards a PoPP in upcoming seasons!
Couldnât agree more! 
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I support this proposal and Iâm looking forward to collaborate with the GIA for the review process in dCompass!
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Thank you Huxwell! We also look forward to collaborating with dCompass.
One of my OKRs is to actually create a training quest in dCompass and that surely will give us insights that may prove valuable for the review process.
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Great discussion going on here that is answering questions for many. Thank you Kyle for challenging the fdd to be fully accountable to the the community and ensuring the excess gets trimmed. It is pushback like that which make for an accurate and lean budget. Every workstream should be trying to provide and solicit feedback like this imo. I have a few thoughts and comments provided below. Looking forward to seeing you around and sharing the latest fdd news.
Yes we have considered it. The idea first arose when thinking about how to hold folks accountable for âbadâ or exploitative behaviour as dao members. This got expanded to ecosystem participants. By taking a stake from new grant applicants (AND potentially EVERY dao member) we now have an ability to incentivize and shape behaviors within the dao. But carrying out these types of thought experiments has a cost. It seems like the FDD is being told âNo you are not meant to be innovating. Your budget is inflated because of un-needed R&Dâ while in the very next breath we are being asked âwhere is the innovation?â
And although such discussions about innovation happen regularly we are mostly focused on carrying out the mission as inherited from Gitcoin inc. We simply lack the people needed to successfully complete the mission while conducting major R & D. But we are continuously growing and filling out gaps in our range of sme. The targeted strategy sessions guided us as a team toward filtering out the weak results from our future goals.
The fact FDD has been a great steward of its budgets demonstrates competence and responsibility. This should be reason to increase the FDD budget not decrease it. The FDD is good with its treasury and they are eager to enlarge the mission focus. I want to see the FDD continue to grow and improve. It was said PGF might be the heart and soul of Gitcoin. Ouch. Well maybe that would make the FDD the liver? We filter out the junk?
Either way, it is hard for me to label any one group as the âheartâ of Gitcoin. It is more of a vibe or a philosophy. But I do know the FDD team is stronger than ever, and ready to carry out the Gitcoin mission.
Full support for this budget. And a sweet dCompass quest.
Joe is a public âgreatâ (nice one Ben) and we are living in the proof. The Dao is maturing nicely. Membership is growing and the folks iâm seeing are very qualified.
Full support for this budget. Bias disclaimer: I am part of this crew.
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staking in the process will have no more of an effect than an increased gas price. itâs an interesting idea, but ultimately a sybil attacker already has to front a large amount for gas. although, it would be worth simulating the affects of such a mechanism. i will keep this in mind as we progress with the matrix (red team) squad.
exactly what is duplicative? the data storage layer is part of ground control, the function of which has been pushed off for a very long time.
also, DAO Ops has proven to be too coarse to actually have a tangible impact in FDD⌠bubble-up emergence of organization is more affective in both the short and long term (isnât this what the DAO wants to facilitateâŚ?) pragmatism (natural selection) rules, not downward imposed idealistic solutions.
do you know what the GIA even is? itâs goal is to decentralize and cut costs in the long term. maybe we arenât communicating itâs function properly (@David_Dyor and i just discussed writing up an article to sum everything up), but simply dismissing it as the âwrong solutionâ seems naiveâŚ
i do somewhat agree. i have been vocal about my discontent with the sybil problem and relying on DID/sybil as a crutch. we had an enlightening exchange with glen weyl (QF paper author) about this.
however i still think your reasoning isnât very well thought out. the double-paying you are referring to is the growing pains of offboarding this responsibility onto the DAO. @omnianalytics is running the initiative to offload our sybil ML process partially onto the community (open source) in collaboration with the data storage layer squad that I lead, which will alleviate a lot of funding in the future.
again⌠staking is not a very well thought out solution, slashing GIA will only harm the ecosystem and make the review process:
- take significantly longer
- require a good deal of human training/inconsistent grant reviews
- cost more to pay for human expert grant reviews
- the same amount of centralized (if not â more)
- inhibit our ability to do finer grained data analysis of the grant-reviewal process
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Once again, there is a great discussion on another FDD proposal; which is consistent with FDDs values to provide an immense amount of transparency to their operations.
I am supportive of this proposal.
FDD is leading the efforts of progressive decentralization within the Gitcoin DAO community.
FDD provides a great amount of Workstream structure for the other Workstreams to follow.
I agree with @DisruptionJoe here;
But also I think what @kyle mentions here is incredibly important. I think there is a need to have a detailed conversation on Workstream treasury management moving forward. I think FDDs practices are proven healthy for the Gitcoin DAO in general, and there should be a learning, trial & error process for all the workstreams to implement and improve what FDD puts on the table as an example.
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FDD is a place where Iâve learned and developed a lot so far, it offers transparency and is open for anyone whoâs eager to be involved in activities and technology that will shape the future.
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