[GCP-005] PASSED Gitcoin Supporting Zuzalu, a first of its kind pop-up city

[shawn16400]

@kyle

Presidential candidates will (most likely) vote for themselves in an election…

Great example, and parliamentarians might not classify these cases as a COIs. but let’s test it and see if the logic holds up:

Candidate voting for himself:
Q: Is the candidate in a position to derive personal benefit (self or family) not available to others?
A: yes if elected, the President would receive a salary.

Q: Are they voting in an official capacity?
A: No, they are voting as private citizens
net: Likely no COI.
The candidate does stand to receive material benefit not available to others, but when the candidate votes, they are voting as a private citizen, and have no more voting power than any other voter. If they mobilized the military to “protect” polling locations - that would be another story.

@kyle

republican/democrat party members will vote for candidates that often are aligned to their values AND often have the perception of improving the lives

Solid, lets test if a Republican has a COI when voting for other Republicans
Q: Is the candidate in a position to derive personal (self or family) benefit not available to others?
A: No, policy usually impacts classes of voters (benefit to many) not just the individuals.

Q: Are they voting in an official capacity?
A: No, they are voting as private citizens

An interesting variation might be the Index Fund managers. Blackrock might have the largest voting block of General Electric (given they retain the voting rights for their index fund investors) and they use that influence to benefit themselves (indirectly) and their shareholders. Any benefit received is spread over the entire class of shareholders, not just Blackrock, the firm itself. If Blackrock received a $50M bonus for helping to electing a specific board member to GE - again, that would be another story

@kyle

If my voting power is delegated, and I continually vote for things that have a CoI, my delegators would remove that delegation.

Makes sense, we would assume delegators look for solid character in voting performance. Although I am not sure how many DAO delegates watch that closely

@kyle

Simply abstaining on a vote for something I believe in because of “perceived CoI” seems undemocratic.

This is an interesting point and it has a very strong lineage. The basic interpretation of a COI in parliamentary procedure states that abstaining from vote due to a COI is recommended (best practice) but it cannot be compelled. (RONR 11th ed. pp 406-407). However it is very common that governing bodies modify this statute to be more restrictive. For example, in Gitcoin DAO Governance Process v3 it states:

Conflicts of Interest

In any case where a steward or community member votes on a proposal that directly benefits themselves (e.g. voting to pass their own workstream budget) that steward or community member’s vote will be considered invalid by default. Any steward may raise a claim of conflict to be addressed prior to a vote being finalized on Tally should this apply.

If a conflict is found, any related vote must be redone and may be considered passed so long as the steward in conflict abstains and the quorum rules are met.

This Gitcoin statute might be a wee bit more restrictive than necessary, but it is a good reference point. There are often questions around COIs so I appreciate the chance to discuss this since it was raised in relation to this proposal. And, also based on the Gov Process v3 above, if a steward calls this vote into question due to a perceived COI with Zuzalu after the vote, we could have a real mess.