I really like the idea of paid, professional delegation arrangements, with clear expectations and scope, and Iâd be honored to be considered. Happy to share more info as needed, and I already have a dedicated delegation EOA at delegate.clinamenic.eth.
Iâve also tossed some ideas around with @Trigs about best practices for professional delegates, e.g. what principles or goals generally undergird oneâs participation in various governance scenarios. Anyway, as an aside, thats something Iâm interested in exploring as well.
Reading Don Quixote now, and perhaps we could use a code for delegates-errant!
Agree with @Clinamenic here. I think this is a great approach and Iâd be honored to be considered as well. Weâve been going down the path of progressive decentralization/protocolization ourselves with @OpenCivics, so I understand the challenges of designing and deploying a process that is both transparent and inclusive while also ensuring timely and strategic decisions.
I would take the role of delegate seriously and bring deep listening to the needs and perspectives of DAO members while being highly transparent and strategic in my thinking. Excited to see where this goes! Either way, Iâm a fan of this strategy.
Love the engagement and interest that weâre already seeing on this strategy! For those who are interested in nominating themselves, once this post has been live for 5 days, Iâll kick nominations off through a separate gov post
Excited to see many key points of improvement suggested in this post. Iâd like to flag that the amount of work that is expected from these high caliber stewards is significant. While I completely agree with the KPIs which are outlined here, I fear that the incentive offered may not be sufficient. Several other DAOs offer significantly higher incentives and demand lower output from their top delegates. Given the fact that experienced governance talent is limited in the space, higher or equivalent incentives are necessary to keep this talent motivated to achieve the goals stated in this proposal.
I do agree that incentives need to be aligned and proportional to the ask and the caliber of those participating.
Based on my experience with Gitcoin as an active participant the volume of information is quite low compared to other DAOs so I do think we should consider that in proportion to the incentives.
With that being said, do you have suggestions on what might need to change or evolve to better align?
Thanks as always for your thoughtful perspectives!
Here is an overview of incentive programs in the ecosystem. As you can see, none of them demand this level of performance, while incentivising on average 6x more than what is being offered in this proposal. So from a professional delegate perspective, its difficult to justify spending business resources on these goals when there is better ROI elsewhere.
Iâd recommend providing a bonus for âproposing 1-2 system improvementsâ instead of includeding it in the mandatory KPIs and bumping up the quarterly comp to atleast match what the rest of the ecosystem offers.
This is great info and I agree that we could adjust to have additional compensation based on performance. I would prefer that if we do that performance would equal new partnerships/driving up distributions towards our north star goal of $30M versus good ideas.
On the report you shared (or others you know of) has there been analysis in the volume of discussions/proposals that delegates must review? In looking at those named in the analysis many of these seem to be much more active than the Gitcoin forum so I am curious how volume could play into the level of effort.
Thanks for this @wasabi - I think weâre down to figure out ways to incentivize this better. We had initially budgeted the council out of the DAO and can turn this into a proper proposal from the treasury with community alignment, so this is healthy discourse.
In regards to a few points:
As you can see, none of them demand this level of performance, while incentivising on average 6x more than what is being offered in this proposal.
Quite a few demand much more than this proposal in much more active forums. Historically weâve jumped into governance improvements as an âall or nothingâ approach and it hasnât moved the needle much. As you can see in our Gov 2025 Strategy weâre starting from first principles and improvements AND a holistic approach to make governance approachable and useful for the community.
Iâd recommend providing a bonus for âproposing 1-2 system improvementsâ instead of includeding it in the mandatory KPIs and bumping up the quarterly comp to atleast match what the rest of the ecosystem offers.
Can you elaborate here? I hardly think making a useful suggestion is worth a bonus, and in fact should be a key trait of council member weâre looking for (something like @owocki 's comment above).
Compensation realistically canât match what the ecosystem offers, nor should it as this a) isnât an apples to apples comparison and b) doesnât have consideration for treasury size. I think the community would be open to something more realistic.
Last point(s) Iâll make are that while the Stablelabs deck is informative it isnât a useful artifact in this conversation because what it doesnât outline is the pros/cons of each program or the activity. Most of the programs I looked at had 40-50+ active topics a month. We simply donât have that volume.
I also want to say that this isnât a critique, I think your notes are highly valuable. Itâs prudent for us to develop this program and our governance in a mindful and intentional way in order for it to be successful, enjoyable and useful for both Gitcoin and its community members.
There are two main perspectives to consider in this scenario:
The DAOâs Perspective: The DAO wants to maximize value for its budget.
The Businessâs Perspective: The business wants to optimize its return on investment (ROI).
There is a âsweet spotâ where both parties can agree on what constitutes fair compensation, with the key variable being the hourly rate. This rate will also influence the caliber of talent available for the project, as more experienced individuals typically demand higher pay.
If the volume of work is expected to be low, it may be helpful to establish clear expectations around the hourly rate, possibly by referencing past examples. Additionally, gathering feedback from the kind of stewards the DAO is targeting can help determine whether the proposed rate is justified based on the expected performance.
This metric is susceptible to gamification, regardless of how itâs incentivized. A bonus structure, with oversight from the core team, offers a balanced approach. It creates an incentive for quality proposals while allowing the core team to evaluate and decide which ones meet the necessary standards.
On the flip side, asking contributors to submit âxâ proposals per quarter could lead to unnecessary or low-quality submissions. Quality proposals require context and expertise, often taking several days to develop, whereas simpler proposals may only take a moment to draft. If the goal is to prioritize quality over quantity, it may be worthwhile to offer higher pay for higher-quality contributions, even if they are fewer in number.
As one of the top external delegates for the past year or so, I am inclined to vote NO on this proposal.
tl;dr -
Stewards should be missionaries; I worry this proposal may attract the mercenaries.
Hereâs my thinkingâŚ
Do I want to see delegates take their job seriously? Yes.
Do I think delegates should have more skin in the game? Yes.
Do I want delegates to be accountable to making smart, principled, independent decisions? Yes.
Do I think delegates should put in the necessary time to actually add value? Yes.
Do I think thereâs an opportunity cost to that time, especially for serious people? Yes.
All âyesââŚ
However, I am worried that paying delegates will attract first and foremost people who want compensation, as opposed to whatâs best for Gitcoin / GTC. The important question to me is how to attract the right people to get involved in stewarding. If compensation is a big blocker to this, we should resolve it and offer compensation. But Iâm not convinced it isâŚ
When I first joined as a steward, there was a larger group of external stewards who received some monthly compensation. Most if not all were airdrop recipients with significant GTC holdings. There was also some automated reporting using DAOStewards ⌠it felt much more professional. @MathildaDV describes this above.
But over time, those stewards moved on and the pool became shallower. Why will this be different?
Coincidentally, I came across this excellent post which @deltajuliet shared in a different group chat:
I think we need something similar for rebooting governance, eventually getting to a pool of super-contributors as stewards, and motivating them accordingly.
Good points re: missionaries/mercenaries, and I do feel like there are some important distinctions to consider re: incentives, which you bring up.
For example, I think this kind of paid delegation arrangement could make sense in situations where âarms-lengthâ counsel is useful, and I agree with you that ecosystem stewards should be more driven by passion than compensation. I say that because, as we all know, ecosystems in need of stewardship will need that stewardship in situations where compensation isnât always available, or at least not at market rates for the work entailed by said stewardship.
So thats something for folks here to consider. Does it make sense to have arms-length delegates, who are compensated for their attention and contributions to governance matters? Or would folks rather governance be handled more intimately/vocationally by stewards?
I think there are valid benefits/risks either way, e.g. arms-length paid professional delegates can offer a fresher perspective, and if they donât have active internal projects at Gitcoin they may be better positioned (i.e. less biased) to assess prospects and triage resources. On the other hand, reserving prominent delegation roles for stewards would arguably ensure greater established context re: proposal review (i.e. stewards are already familiar with Gitcoin affairs).
I definitely agree non-steward delegates shouldnât be ex officio stewards, but it may be useful to have non-steward delegates provide perspective from an arms-length distance from Gitcoin ops, especially since these folks would be from the wider Gitcoin community anyway.
Appreciate your thoughts here @ccerv1 and as an active steward here for a while I value your judgement. Those contributor paths pipeline is something that I have been wanting to implement in another area within the community for a while (or a version thereof), as I think itâs a very valuable. When it comes to baking that into a governance strategy, I think thatâs a wayâs away though and could be a really good longterm goal as we continue to push forward our gov goals of 2025.
I wasnât around when stewards were first onboarded. Part of the problem IMO with consistency over the years that I have been here is that there has been many handovers of processes and a lot of turnover so perhaps thatâs where things have gotten lost and a lot of stop-starts. That being said, though, one of the top feedbacks that we have received is that stewards should be compensated/incentivized better and I did see a lot of decline in activity/engagement since I started. This is part of what we aim to solve for this year: Gitcoin Governance Strategy 2025. And thatâs why Iâm confident that this will be different and that it may be a strong stepping to a stronger incentive structure such as contributor paths.
The one change we could make is elect the council for 6 months instead of a year and at the end of that term we re-evaluate the value. That way weâre also keeping ourselves accountable. I would love to also hear @Sovâs thoughts here!
From the perspective of the GG Council and their responsibilities (which this new council structure would also be responsible for), is that those members expressed interest to become more engaged within the Gitcoin ecosystem on a broader level as it helps with context setting when making decisions about Community Rounds within GG, so I would personally be excited to see a council be more engaged in a few different areas beyond only the gov forum.
Weâll take this to a vote next so that we can get it finalized.
Thanks for tagging me. I am down to make the term on this a trial of six months to test the waters.
I hear all the thoughts and concerns here from others. For me (and I may be biased in this view), I would like to see from the council a generative aspect that drives towards our North Star distribution goals through our tools, and I believe that aligning compensation to this is needed (and the direction many other DAOs are going).
For that, I think we would need individuals and teams with relationships/clout across the wider Ethereum Ecosystem to help us move the needle in this respect versus what we have seen to this point.
I have updated the post reflecting initial 6 months to be a trial period, subject to mandatory evaluation and potential adjustment. Thank you everyone for your input! Excited to see some next steps here.
Itâs always nice to see governance at Gitcoin progressively being decentralized and having community engagement! To add ontop of this, I would also suggest a delegates training program being open to the commmunity like the Round managers training so the quality of delegates is always high and members from within the community being empowered.
Just chiming in on here as well, Iâd like to recommend Borderless Africa which Iâm part of. Also a delegate at Scroll, where we voice the sounds of African builders. Would be great to see Gitcoinâs growth in Africa and attract top talent to The Ethereum ecoystsem.
Thanks for nominating! As someone who was also part of the earlier GG council, Iâd probably make way for new blood.
My wife Nidhi Harihar joined the regen space around 6 months ago. Sheâs very diligent and i think she would be a great fit!
I think what I like about this is the clear demarcation of work required:vote on GG community rounds, expand partnerships with other DAOs and take part in core governance.
If it was just core governance i would be worried, but given the other responsibilities i see it more as a replacement of the 2024 GG council with some extension to general governance and partnerships.
One update I would like to highlight is that after some reflection and feedback, we have lightened the scope of work for the delegates, removing the âecosystem growthâ piece, ensuring that the expectations outlined for the delegates and compensation may balance out more.