Hey Kyle, I suspect that over time the right place for these kind of issues would be the Steward Council given it does have a measure of impartiality and it includes both internal and external resources. However given the Steward Council is in its first elected season and the efficacy of the council has not been proven (vs. the cost), it may be premature to assign this to the Steward Council. If the council is not renewed in three months due to a poor ROI, we would have a gap.
To your point, we could design a process that could steer decisions to one body vs. another depending on the type, but I might suggest we take that step if the volume “reconsiderations” proves problematic.
Regardless, this is what I would describe as a “happy problem”. Gitcoin has two possible options for this kind of process where many orgs would scramble to come up with one legitimate body. And in either case, if the decision is made to reconsider a vote, the token holders own the ultimate decision.
But, as there are opinions on this on both sides, there are pros & cons for both sides, let’s do the democratic thing and get a sense from those following this discussion.
Which body should decide if Gitcoin holds a “reconsider” vote
The CSDO team should be the body to “reconsider”
The Steward Council should be the body to “reconsider”
I agree with the nuance @kyle puts forth in that we may want to have separate “reconsider” bodies depending on the type of vote (i.e., some stuff might be better for CSDO, other stuff for SC).
Not to open up a whole new can of worms, but my understanding is that the GCP process itself is pretty new and kind of still in development — so maybe this ‘reconsider’ process should be developed and implemented in the context of that broader process, and also separately in terms of the non-GCP proposals process.
Thank you @annika - I appreciate your input on this. Building on input from @kyle what if we broke the reconsideration down like this:
CSDO: Votes that impact what the DAO does:
(ex: budgets, x-stream efforts, governance changes)
Steward Council: Votes impacting the ecosystem
(ex: partnerships, Grants program changes, bubble cases)
Backtesting this logic, in the last 9 months I see about 8 cases that might have gone to the SC based on this segregation (if there were a reconsideration case brought)
[GCP-001] - Funding IndexCoop gtcETH offering
GR16 Round Structure
Ratify the Results of Grants Round 15 and Payout Matching Allocation
GR15 Round Structure
GR14 Round Structure & Grants Eligibility Update
Withdraw $10MM of GTC to diversify our treasury and increase governance partners
Ratify the Results of Grants Round 13 and Payout Matching Allocations
Partnership & Mutual Grant with Wonder
@kyle@annika does this segregation sense and get to your needs?
It does make sense. Perhaps there is a default as well? In the short term, when there is confusion CSDO is the correct body, and then longer term as we continue to decentralize, we can transition that to Token holders (or Stewards if that remains a concept)?
I am part of the Steward Council, and I do think an external / internal group like this would be well suited to decide whether a vote should be reconsidered, as it would be less susceptible to internal politics / have a more removed point of view on whether the issue is material.
I’m not sure that group would be well suited to propose that the vote be reconsidered in the first place.
I like the specification that someone who voted for a proposal that passed or against a proposal that failed be the one to bring up the consideration of another vote.
Perhaps CSDO proposes and SC determines whether to reopen?
I think the “Rage-quit” mechanics are the example of this in Moloch.
Members who disagree with the decision to approve a certain proposal can Rage-quit and leave with their funds before the proposal passes.
How would this look if the DAO was able to “Rage-quit” funding a work-stream I don’t know but kind of fascinating as an example of liquid governance.
For example, I would love to be able to revoke my tokens for a certain initiative if I felt the leader of that initiative was no longer capable or qualified to execute on it.
I think the Stewards should probably be the ones to review the case and make the final decision, sort of like DAO jury duty let the people who are not closest to the situation hear the facts and then make a decision.
Overall I think having some kind of a claw back mechanism for proposals that don’t have the full support of the DAO should be enacted, so that we can stay fluid with our decision making process and ensure everyone held is to the highest standards.
Happy to be involved or brainstorm about the specifics on this process as it develops.
Today we presented this proposal to the Steward Council and through deliberations arrived at a suggested hybrid solution. A CSDO member would be the one to raise the case to the Steward Council for consideration, ideally but not necessarily, after bringing it for discussion at CSDO. This path allows CSDO to loosely gatekeep referrals (any CSDO member can raise a referral), but then sends the issue on to the Steward Council for a decision. Thank you to @ebransom@eugyal@drnicka@ccerv1@epowell101@griff@kyle@kevin.olsen and @ceresstation for the input and great discussion.
Hey @Yalor I really like the rage quit concept, especially from a co-founder and early start up perspective. This kind of a mechanism incentivizes major token-holder collaboration (in order not to diminish the treasury) but allows for a planned exit when common ground cannot be found.
For Gitcoin Stewards, it might have less applicability given many of our stewards hold more delegated tokens vs owned tokens. And rage quitting for Gitcoin stewards or contributors means they might have rage, they might quit, but the cost to the DAO is social/reputational vs. having a treasury impact.
For anyone interested in the rage quit concept, here is a quick article.
You nailed it. One of the gaps in our budgeting process is that we have only binary votes and signaling is only up/down. If you compare FDD and DAOops S16 vs. S17 vote performance, there is little correlating voting data suggesting a workstream is in jeopardy - indicators are all social.
@krrisis Umar and I are working on an updated budgeting process should allow for better signaling.
Consensus is building around this direction and is consistent with what the Steward Council told us yesterday. Thanks for the affirmation and engagement @Yalor, it really helps.
I have updated this proposal based on input from the steward council meeting on 03.08. You can view the live stream of that meeting here
The major adjustment with the proposal is that CSDO initiates the motion to reconsider, and the subject is then taken up by the Steward Council for decision. This adjustment allows an internal body with maximum context (CSDO) to raise and issue, but then refers the decision an elected/appointed body for decision (Steward Council).
Thanks @ebransom for this concept - it is an elegant solution that leverages the strengths of both bodies.
If we receive a few more comments on this post from Stewards, we will move this from “ideas and open discussion” to the “proposal” phase.
if you want to see the original proposal - you can find it here:
I think my voice here would count this as a fifth steward voice allowing this to move forward. Additionally, I’ll state here that I’m ok with applying this process to FDD’s season 17 vote.
Thank you to the following stewards who commented on this proposal here on the forum @epowell101@DisruptionJoe@kyle@Yalor@ebransom and @annika and thanks to the community members @alif313@jengajojo for the input. Given we have 5+ steward comments, we have moved this to the proposal category with the intention of going to snapshot for vote in the week of March 13, 2023.
Put up a snapshot vote to ratify the revote process
Conduct the revote process on FDD S17 Budget Request
If revote is requested using this new process, then I would repost the vote for FDD S17 Budget Request. If it wasn’t requested using the process, then delegates with enough tokens delegated on Tally would be required to post the FDD S17 Budget Request as is.
For the record, I’m expecting the revote to be requested. My purpose has been to get this process solidified and I consider this result a success.
Quick Reminder - Solving this whole issue is literally an objective I put forward for FDD S17 dissolution success:
I will likely craft a separate GCP to directly ask for a similar amount of funds to dogfood the Allo protocol for a sybil defense round which would be featured during the beta rounds.
Hi @DisruptionJoe
I don’t want to get too far ahead of ourselves, given this proposal has to pass first, but if it does pass, and the FDD budget fails to be taken up for reconsideration (either voted down, or not considered by the steward council) then you are correct, the FDD budget would have to be posted and ratified via Tally.
Hey Shawn - Can you be more specific on what this structure looks like? How does the Steward council vote… is it a majority vote? is it that a member of that council presents the option to revote and a second member affirms the need for a revote, etc.
Would love to vote on this proposal but dont feel I have enough details to support yet.
Hi Kyle,
Thanks for the question. According to the text in the proposal, the steward council votes for a “reconsideration” or against a reconsideration using a simple majority vote. The reconsider motion is brought to the steward council via a CSDO member which meets the criteria.
The reference was obscure in the proposal, so thanks for asking the question and raising this up.
From the proposal:
Also, as I mentioned briefly in our quick discussion, we did not define a quorum for a decision takens by the Stewards Council. Said another way, what minimum number of Steward Council members should be in attendance before a vote can be called? Typically, a quorum is anywhere from a 51% (most common) to 66% (less common) of a voting body, as defined by that body. To avoid this turning into an issue in the future, I will add that topic for our next steward council election.
Hmm this process though sounds nice, I can see it complicating the governance process and introducing a lot of strife.
In the motivation section you mention:
Without a controlled process in place, the DAO is at risk for being forced to implement outdated decisions, move in an uncoordinated fashion, or make inappropriate or unauthorized declarations in order to repeal decisions in a way that might cause the entire governance process to be called into question.
But can you perhaps give a more contrete example than in the specifications? Why should any member of the CSDO have the power to ask for a vote recondisderation?
I can see this being open to abuse and for creating impermanence in the way governance works.
Finally getting a chance to read through this. Kudos on the thoughtfulness behind this and I’m fully supportive.
One clarification I’d like:
I’m not 100% sure I understand this one sentence.
The original proposer can propose again - great.
And if they don’t propose, then what happens?
If the vote is being "reconsidered, isn’t the vote considered null and void regardless?
I don’t know but kind of fascinating as an example of liquid governance.
let the people who are not closest to the situation hear the facts and then make a decision.
